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Media Framing of Financial Mechanisms for
Resolving Human–Predator Conflict in Namibia
NIKI A. RUST
Durrell Institute of Conservation and Ecology, University of Kent, Canterbury,
United Kingdom
The decline in carnivore populations is largely exacerbated by lethal methods used to
reduce livestock depredation. Financial mechanisms are designed to limit lethal control
by reducing the cost of depredation. The media can affect how the general public feel
about issues like financial mechanisms but no study has been undertaken to understand
the framing of this topic. This article filled this gap by using content analysis of newspa-
pers to analyze economic incentives designed to mitigate human–carnivore conflict in
Namibia. Forty-six percent of the articles were framed positively toward incentives, 24%
ambivalently, 19% negatively, and 11% neutrally. Compensation was commonly framed
positively whereas community-based conservation, trophy hunting, and tourism were
framed ambivalently. Incentives were framed more negatively where perceived costs
outweighed benefits. These results can help conservationists plan more effective com-
munication interventions and anticipate issues that can affect the success of mitigation
strategies.
Keywords carnivore conservation, compensation, economic incentives, human–
wildlife conflict, trophy hunting
Introduction
Human–wildlife conflict occurs when the needs of humans are negatively affected by the
needs or behavior of wildlife, or vice versa (Madden, 2004). This conflict poses one of
the greatest threats to large carnivores globally (Inskip & Zimmermann, 2009). In southern
Africa, where many humans live below the poverty line, carnivores can severely affect the
economic stability of households as these species predate upon valuable livestock, which
can cause financial ruin if there is no alternative income available (Rust & Marker, 2014).
Techniques that reduce the likelihood of carnivore predation on livestock range from
the lethal to non-lethal (reviewed in Linnell, Smith, Odden, Swenson, & Kaczensky, 1996).
Lethal techniques can provide short-term relief from depredation but their widespread
application is not always conducive to sustainable management of threatened carnivore
species (Treves & Naughton-Treves, 2005), thus effective non-lethal alternatives are
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Framing Finance Mechanisms for Resolving Conflict 441
often sought out (Sillero-Zubiri & Laurenson, 2001). For example, financial mech-
anisms aim to reduce the financial burden that carnivores place on livestock farm-
ers (Dickman, Macdonald, & Macdonald, 2011). Compensation—one type of financial
incentive—directly pays farmers for livestock reportedly killed by carnivores (Ogada,
Woodroffe, Oguge, & Frank, 2003), whereas photographic tourism—a different finan-
cial incentive—could provide income to locals by tourists paying to see wild carnivores
(Stander, Ilau, Jui, Dabe, & Dabe, 1997). Regardless of the mechanism, the goal is to
increase the value of carnivores so that they are worth more alive than dead to the people
who live alongside them (Dickman et al., 2011; Nelson, 2009).
Although global carnivore conservation efforts follow broadly similar methods, spe-
cific applications vary depending on local circumstances. Namibia, for example, has
increasing carnivore populations (NACSO, 2013), partly because the country has a large
geographic area under wildlife conservation (NACSO, 2013). As such, a variety of differ-
ent financial mechanisms are employed to increase the benefits of living with carnivores
while decreasing their costs (Table 1).
Although not strictly a financial incentive itself, the Namibian conservancy model
provides benefits to communities through income derived from trophy hunting, culling,
and photographic tourism (Nature Conservation Amendment Act, 1996). Conservancies
are legally defined protected areas where residents are conferred property rights over the
wildlife on their land and are thus able to utilize natural resources consumptively and
non-consumptively. Conservancy members can continue agricultural practices but can also
build lodges for tourists and/or hunters, both of which can potentially provide income for
local communities. Conservancy members also receive compensation payments for damage
Table 1
Financial mechanisms used in Namibia to mitigate human–carnivore conflict
Financial mechanism Description of financial mechanism
Compensation Monetary payments made if livestock is proven to be killed by
a carnivore (Esterhuizen, 2004)
Conservancies Neighboring landholders share costs of carnivore prevention
and benefit from carnivores through provision of property
rights (NACSO, 2013)
Eco-labels Farmers receive a price premium on meat that is farmed in a
predator-friendly manner (Marker, Mills, & Macdonald,
2003)
Insurance Small premiums are paid by farmers to insure their livestock
against depredation; if depredation occurs, full payment will
be given on the condition that measures were taken to
reduce chance of depredation (Kasaona, 2006)
Tourism Income received from tourists who pay to view carnivores
(Stander et al., 1997)
Trophy hunting Income received from trophy hunters who kill carnivores
(Marker et al., 2003)
Other financial
incentives
Grants and loans are provided to farmers to offset the costs of
farming in a landscape shared with carnivores
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caused by wildlife (Kasaona, 2006). Although conservancies have been successful at pro-
viding benefits to local communities, these benefits are sometimes not distributed equitably
(Rust & Marker, 2013).
As the use of financial incentives to reduce human–carnivore conflict is relatively
prevalent throughout the country, the national media sometimes reports on their usage.
Namibian newspapers cover both the financial incentives used and the benefits and disad-
vantages of implementing these tools to mitigate conflict. Assessing how the national media
frame interventions to reduce carnivore conflict can help conservationists strategically plan
communications and anticipate what kinds of issues people believe affect conservation
interventions.
Conceptual Framework and Objectives
Media and Frames
A frame is “a way of packaging and positioning an issue so that it conveys a certain mean-
ing” (Menashe & Siegel, 1998, p. 310); it can be thought of as a meta-message that guides
the article in a particular direction (Tannen, 1993). Frames are important because peo-
ple’s decisions can be changed through minor alterations in the way that problems are
framed (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). Opinions can also be shaped by the way that the
media conveys information on environmental issues, which, in turn, can shape further head-
lines (Jensen, 2003). The media has the power to transform attitudes towards biodiversity
(although not always, see Gore, Siemer, Shanahan, Schuefele, & Decker, 2005), as well as
the policies and campaigns aimed at wildlife conservation (Gore & Knuth, 2009; Messmer,
Reiter, & West, 2001). A frame’s valence refers to whether it is conveyed largely in a
positive or negative manner; this valence can affect public support for policies (de Vreese
& Boomgaarden, 2003). News articles often contain quotes from stakeholders involved in
conversation. The people chosen to provide quotes for a story can also influence how the
readers perceive the issue (Jacobson, Langin, Carlton, & Kaid, 2011). Because the media
controls the themes it focuses on and the amount of coverage of news items, the media is
an important actor involved in wildlife management.
Analysis of media frames about conservation challenges have been used to understand
narrative on topics related to human–carnivore conflict. Previous research has examined
how the media covers topics such as “problem animals,” incidents of attacks by carnivores,
and how media coverage shapes attitudes toward predators (Alexander & Quinn, 2012;
Gore & Knuth, 2009; Houston, Bruskotter, & Fan, 2010). However, there has been no
known published research conducted to date on the news coverage of financial mecha-
nisms for influencing wildlife conservation. This is problematic because these schemes are
widespread across the globe (Dickman et al., 2011) and the media may influence attitudes
if articles are constantly framed positively or negatively, as has been shown in other dis-
ciplines (Brewer, Graf, & Willnat, 2003; Terkildsen & Schnell, 1997). Attitudes toward
incentives are important to understand as they could reveal the types of mechanisms that
are most acceptable and to whom, the schemes that are thought to be succeeding or fail-
ing and the reasons for this, and the stakeholder groups that are most positive or negative
toward each scheme. Information on how the media frame financial mechanisms could
also assist wildlife managers efforts to communicate with stakeholders and the media on
effective carnivore conservation methods (Siemer, Decker, & Shanahan, 2007), as well as
improve outreach and management efforts (Jacobson et al., 2011).
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Aim and Objectives
This article sought to understand how the media framed financial incentives to mitigate
human–carnivore conflict in Namibia. The objectives were to determine (a) the types of
financial mechanisms that were discussed in Namibian newspapers in relation to carnivore
conservation, their relative frequencies and whether they were used alone or with other
mitigation measures, (b) the valence of the articles, and (c) the stakeholder groups used as
sources within the articles.
Methods
Sampling Frame
Content analysis of newspapers was used to achieve the above objectives. Five of the
most popular Namibian newspapers with a total weekly readership of 173,000 were
used in the content analysis: Informante (65,000 copies printed week), The Namibian
(40,000 copies/week), Namibian Economist (7,000 copies/week), Namibian Sun
(36,000 copies/week), and New Era (25,000 copies/week). These newspapers were chosen
due to their wide readership (in comparison to other national newspapers that have reader-
ships below 5,000 copies/week each), their use of English language (which is the national
language of Namibia), and the ability to search their websites for archived articles.
Each of the newspapers’ search engines was used to search for keywords in online
articles (see Appendix for the full list of keywords used), which scanned the titles and con-
tent of each article. The search included articles written by journalists, as well as editorials
and letters written by the general public to the editor. The newspapers listed articles on their
websites from the date when newspapers began indexing articles online (which ranged from
January 1, 2004 to January 1, 2010) until the date of the search. All search engines provided
results from order of relevance to the key words used. Data collection took place between
January–February 2013.
No sampling was used to select articles; all 122 articles identified through the searches
were read and analyzed. Articles not specifically related to research objectives (e.g., not
related to Namibia or not discussing carnivores) were excluded from analysis. Prior to
searching for the defined keywords, a random sample (n = 15) of the articles were read and
analyzed to assist with developing the protocol and codebook (Evans & FitzGerald, 2002).
Coding Protocol
Each article was read and coded for sections that referred to financial mechanisms to mit-
igate human–carnivore conflict. Rather than using automated computer programs, each
article was read independently by two coders (Morris, 1994) to increase reliability and
reduce bias.
First, information related to the research objectives were collected and saved onto
a computer worksheet. To answer objective 1, the following data were recorded: title
and main synopsis and incentive measures proposed/used; for objective 2, additional
information collected included the valence of article; finally, for objective 3, information
was recorded on the stakeholder group(s) of the article’s author or the interview respon-
dents. Articles that noted more than one stakeholder group were also recorded. Articles
sometimes conveyed both positive and negative valences: if each stakeholder group within
the article expressed opposing attitudes towards incentives, valences were attributed to each
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stakeholder. If one stakeholder mentioned both positive and negative aspects, an ambiva-
lent valence was coded. There were no instances of articles written by journalists where
stakeholder groups were not interviewed or sourced. Stakeholders were categorized as: aca-
demics, carnivore conservation nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), community-based
conservation NGOs, farmers, general public, government officials, or hunters.
Second, each article was systematically coded to ascribe numbers to variables (see
below) that related to the research questions. Codes were mutually exclusive, exhaustive
and applied consistently throughout the coding process. The two coders were trained in the
coding protocol.
Codes were developed for four variables: (a) type of financial mechanism(s) discussed,
(b) valence of each financial mechanism (i.e., positive, negative, neutral or ambivalent), (c)
stakeholder group(s) that either wrote or were interviewed for the article, and (d) whether
financial incentives were used alone or with other mitigation measures such as livestock
guarding dogs or herders.
Compensation and insurance schemes were combined into one category because the
compensation scheme previously offered to communal conservancy members of Namibia
had changed to an insurance scheme in some areas (Bowen-Jones, 2012). When referring
to either compensation or insurance schemes throughout the rest of this article, the term
“compensation” was used for brevity. Financial incentive schemes that provided in-kind
donations (e.g., replacement livestock, guarding dogs) were treated separately because they
did not involve direct monetary transfer.
Third, inter-coder reliability of all variables was checked using Cohen’s Kappa (K)
(Cohen, 1960). When the reliability was < .7, articles were re-coded. Values > .7 demon-
strate a strong level of reliability (Lombard, Snyder-Dutch, & Bracken, 2002). When K
< .07, both coders discussed discrepancies, and independently recoded articles for those
variables. After the second round of coding, the inter-coder reliability for all variables was
>.7 and analysis proceeded.
Valence of Frame
Following Houston et al. (2010)’s approach for defining a frame’s valence, financial mech-
anisms were deemed to have a positive valence where there was a clear positive message
being given about the scheme by the stakeholder (e.g., “conservancies allow benefits to
flow to those who are living with wildlife”); negative messages included phrases such as
“no conservancy member has ever been paid compensation”; ambivalent messages included
phrases such as “wildlife impacts people and their properties but also brings benefits.” A
neutral valence was assigned when no opinion given as to the positive or negative effects
of a financial mechanism.
Data Analysis
Chi-square was used to determine whether there was a significant difference between the
frequency of positive, negative, neutral or ambivalent valences of each financial incentive.
Significance was set at p < .05. Qualitative data analysis was also used to contextualize
the findings. A grounded theory approach was used to search for common themes in the
data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Quotes from the articles were used to capture the essence
of each theme, which helped explain and contextualize the results obtained (Auerbach &
Silverstein, 2003).
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Results
Types of Financial Incentives
The most common incentive measure reported in the 122 articles was compensation, fol-
lowed by trophy hunting (Table 2). Financial mechanisms were most often mentioned as a
single mitigation technique without reference to other measures (72%). This was followed
with a combination of livestock husbandry changes to reduce depredation, monitoring of
carnivores and training of farmers on how to protect livestock (24%) and then with social
assistance such as help with school fees (4%).
Stakeholder Groups
The majority of articles were either written by individuals working for NGOs, or were
journalists who interviewed individuals from NGOs (Table 3). Academics were rarely used
as information sources within the articles.
Framing of Incentives
A total of 56 (46%) articles had a positive valence, 29 (24%) were ambivalent, 23 (19%)
were negative, and 14 (11%) articles had a neutral valence. The frequency of articles with
a positive valence of compensation was significantly greater (p < .001) than the frequency
of articles with a mixed, negative, or neutral valence (Table 4), whereas significantly (p =
.037) more articles on conservancies were written ambivalently. The frequency of eco-
labels, loans, and grants mentioned in articles were too small to conduct statistical tests on,
although articles that included these financial mechanisms spoke positively of them.
Of the articles with a positive valence of compensation, 15 (75%) of stakeholders did
not have experience of using this financial incentive to mitigate conflict, but rather spoke
of the potential benefits. However, of the articles on compensation where the valence was
negative, ambivalent, or neutral, 16 (89%) of stakeholders had experience of the incentive.
One government official, for example, stated that compensation “is extremely expensive
Table 2
Frequency and percentage of carnivore conservation financial incentive
types reported in Namibian newspapers
Incentive type Frequency (%)
Compensation 52 (30)
Trophy hunting 38 (22)
Tourism 36 (20)
Conservancies 27 (15)
Eco-labels 6 (3)
Other1 5 (3)
Diversifying incomes2 4 (2)
Grants 4 (2)
Fines 3 (2)
1Includes taxes, loans, or property rights.
2Includes growing crops or opening businesses to provide additional income.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [2
.21
6.1
43
.82
] a
t 0
2:4
9 2
6 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
5 
446 N. A. Rust
Table 3
Frequency and percentage of stakeholder groups used as sources in Namibian newspaper
articles on financial mechanisms to mitigate human-carnivore conflict
Stakeholder group of respondent Frequency (%)
Conservancy NGO 46 (38)
Government officials 27 (22)
NGO supporting carnivores 21 (17)
Farmers or farming organizations 10 (8)
Hunter or hunting organization 6 (5)
General public 6 (5)
Academic 3 (2)
Tourism operator 3 (2)
Table 4
Frequency (percentage in brackets) of valence of financial mechanisms reported in
Namibian newspapers for mitigating carnivore conflict
Mechanism Positive Ambivalent Negative Neutral p value, df = 3
Compensation 20 (61)∗ 4 (12) 5 (15) 4 (12) p < .001∗, χ2 = 22.3
Conservancy 7 (21) 15 (47)∗ 5 (16) 5 (16) p = .037∗, χ2 = 8.5
Eco-label 5 (100) 0 0 0 n/a
Loan/grant 3 (67) 0 0 1 (33) n/a
Tourism 5 (25) 6 (30) 5 (25) 4 (20) p = .940, χ2 = 0.4
Trophy hunting 10 (42) 3 (12) 6 (25) 5 (21) p = .228, χ2 = 4.3
∗Significantly different.
and difficult to verify and manage, much as it is difficult to assess and determine the value
of losses.” Valences were often negative toward compensation when it was not received;
for example, after a number of uncompensated livestock attacks, “farmers . . . threatened
to declare war on the lions.” Even when compensation was received, stakeholders often
complained of late or partial payments and corruption within the scheme.
Conservancies were framed ambivalently as it was thought that although financial ben-
efits were received, the protection of wildlife could also increase the numbers of predators
on the land, leading to more instances of human–wildlife conflict. For instance, one article
that started by discussing the benefits of conservancies then ended with “[t]he number of
conflicts between people and wild animals has increased.” As well as the negative aspects
of conservancies, there were reported benefits. Conservationists quoted in the articles often
mentioned the increases in carnivore populations as clear benefits of conservancies. For
example, one carnivore conservationist mentioned that he “attributed the increase in the
number of desert lions to the creation of conservancies, as they have given people an
appreciation of the value of the animals.”
Photographic tourism received a mixed response from stakeholders. Conservationists
were positive of its ability to mitigate human–wildlife conflict (e.g., “[c]rucial to the con-
servation of carnivores, according to Wild Dog Project, is the [p]romotion of species-based
tourism concentrating on wild dogs . . . to reduce conflict on farmlands”), whereas local
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communities complained that income did not fully offset the costs of damage incurred.
For example, several newspapers ran stories on an entire pride of lions that was reportedly
killed due to instances of livestock depredation suffered by local farmers.
Trophy hunting was often discussed positively by trophy hunters (n = 9, 90%) and
negatively by conservationists (n = 5, 83%). For example, one executive member of the
national trophy hunting organization said that “the ability to utilise cheetahs sustainably,
just like any other natural living resource, aids conservation efforts by giving landowners
and communal conservancy members economic incentives to preserve, rather than reduce,
the cheetah population.” Carnivore conservationists, however, were concerned with the lack
of benefits to both people and predators: “This practice has no community benefit and is
destructive to the conservation of this keystone predator. . . . Trophy hunting as a means
of alleviating human wildlife conflict is indiscriminate and therefore ineffective in dealing
with an actual problem animal. . . . Financial benefits to the community through hyena
trophy-hunting . . . is minimal.”
A concern raised by 12 (10%) articles was the equitable sharing of benefits received
from tourism and trophy hunting. For example, one article mentioned a large private game
reserve owner who wished to turn Namibia into a wildlife park for international tourists.
A letter to the editor, however, expressed severe concern to this: “is it not a mistake to
allow [carnivores] to live within the same area as our people? . . . Is the grand plan to make
the whole of Rural Namibia an amusement park by 2030?”. The author was worried that
tourism would only benefit tourism businesses rather than local communties living with
predators.
Discussion
Namibian newspapers were used to illustrate the nature and extent to which the media can
frame valences toward using financial mechanisms to mitigate human–carnivore conflict.
Compensation, tourism, trophy hunting and conservancies were the most frequently dis-
cussed financial methods in the articles. Compensation was the most common incentive
and was referred to more frequently in a positive manner than the other methods. Articles
used in this article often highlighted the benefits of compensation to offset the costs of
livestock depredation. However, government employees interviewed in the articles men-
tioned that the government was unwilling to accept responsibility for losses to carnivores
by paying compensation to farmers, particularly because of the complexity of verifying
damage. This concern questions the effectiveness of using compensation for wildlife con-
servation, which has also been noted by others (Nyhus, Osofsky, Ferraro, Madden, &
Fischer, 2005). In communities that were meant to receive compensation but where pay-
ment was not paid, locals became frustrated at the scheme. This could result in widespread
poaching of predators if communities do not receive what is perceived to be adequate reim-
bursement for damage to property, as has happened elsewhere in Africa (Hazzah et al.,
2014).
Stakeholders who were profiled in news media stories and who conveyed positive atti-
tudes towards compensation only discussed this method as a potential tool to mitigate the
conflict but did not have previous experience of using it to resolve the issue due to lack of
funding to initiate the scheme. The reported number of articles in this study that mentioned
the positive aspects of compensation cannot therefore be used as proof that this financial
incentive is effective at mitigating conflict. Other research has indicated that, after experi-
ence with compensation in Wisconsin, USA, farmers were no more tolerant of carnivores
than those who did not receive compensation (Naughton-Treves, Grossberg, & Treves,
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2003). Similar to critics elsewhere, the results herein support the literature on cautioning
the use of compensation to mitigate conflict with carnivores (Nyhus et al., 2005). It may be
beneficial for conservation academics to liaise with the media regarding the pros and cons
of compensation schemes to ensure that the general public receive accurate information on
this particular incentive.
Namibian conservancies in this article were most often framed with an ambivalent
valence. For this incentive scheme to be successful at improving coexistence between
carnivores and conservancy members, benefits of carnivores must offset their costs (Rust
& Marker, 2013). Improving this situation might not only change the current ambiva-
lent attitude toward conservancies, but could also increase tolerance to carnivores (Rust
& Marker, 2013). This suggests that community-based conservation schemes that aim to
provide income to local communities living with wildlife will only succeed if the income
can offset the costs of living with wildlife (Emerton, 2001), which may prove difficult to
achieve.
Money from photographic tourism was reported by carnivore conservation NGOs as
a useful method to provide income to locals, which they thought could offset the costs of
living with carnivores. However, similar to the problems with conservancies, communities
interviewed in the articles often complained that the income was not sufficient to cover
the costs of depredation. This is worrying as it could lead to an increase in lethal control
of carnivores if these species are deemed more valuable dead rather than alive, as was
shown in Tanzania and Kenya (Goldman, Roque de Pinho, & Perry, 2013). To ensure that
lethal control is a less attractive option in such situations, it may be beneficial to provide
additional support to areas with high levels of livestock depredation, such as subsidized
fencing to protect livestock from attacks by carnivores (Karlsson & Sjöström, 2011).
Trophy hunters that were interviewed in the study’s articles reported that trophy hunt-
ing could create a high-value product that reimbursed residents from damage-causing
carnivores. Previous research has shown that achieving a similar profit from photographic
tourism would be much more time-consuming and expensive, as photographic tourists
require both a lodge and sufficient charismatic game to be attracted to visit the area
(Lindsey, Alexander, Frank, Mathieson, & Romanach, 2006). Many areas of Namibia, how-
ever, do not have either of these and therefore trophy hunting provided the only viable
income-generating avenue from wildlife (NACSO, 2013). Carnivore conservation NGOs
in this article were concerned that trophy hunting of rare carnivores was not ecologically
sustainable and instead thought that incentives to conserve carnivores must be created
exclusively from photographic tourism. However, as mentioned previously, tourism may
not fully outweigh the costs of depredation. It is advisable that tourism not be used as the
sole financial mechanism to provide benefits to communities for carnivore presence where
the income does not offset the costs.
Some newspaper articles reported that the main problem with incentive schemes was
that money was only being distributed to a few individuals, rather than those who were most
affected by carnivores. It is unclear as to who is benefitting from wildlife and whether this
benefit distribution is equitable (Sachedina & Nelson, 2010). The governance of financial
mechanisms must be addressed to ensure that corruption and elite capture is minimized
(Dickman et al., 2011). If these problems cannot be overcome, it is unlikely that financial
mechanisms will reduce lethal control of carnivores.
Financial mechanisms were frequently discussed without mention of other mitigation
techniques, such as educating the public on the value of carnivores or using barrier methods
to prevent depredation. This may be one of the reasons for the ambivalent and negative
attitudes towards these financial tools because depredation can often be reduced effectively
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through improvements to husbandry techniques (Ogada et al., 2003; Rust, Whitehouse-
Tedd, & MacMillan, 2013; Woodroffe, Frank, Lindsey, Ole Ranah, & Romañach, 2006),
which would automatically lessen the financial burden that carnivores place upon livestock
farmers. Newspaper editors could be made aware of this to ensure that the public are not
misguided into thinking that a single technique will reduce conflict sufficiently.
Academics were rarely sourced for interviews and infrequently wrote letters to the edi-
tor on this subject, whereas members of NGOs dominated authorship and interviews for the
articles. It is advisable that conservation academics engage more often with the media on
this topic to ensure unbiased, evidence-based knowledge of these financial mechanisms is
reported. It may also prove useful for academics to write about other conservation incentive
measures that have been successful in different countries, such as conservation payments
in Sweden (Zabel & Holm-Muller, 2008). The use of compensation, trophy hunting, pho-
tographic tourism, and conservancies are well-known techniques in Namibia to mitigate
this conflict, but there are other financial mechanisms that could be tested in this country.
The media could play a role in assisting with creating awareness of their use in mitigat-
ing conflict (Gore & Knuth, 2009), although it must be stressed that the media is not very
effective at changing the opinions of close-knit social groups that strongly disbelieve the
newspaper’s content (Moser, 2010).
This article reaffirms that content analysis is a useful but not perfect tool for under-
standing human dimensions of wildlife management; articles often have biased perspectives
with hidden agendas that advocate for certain points of views. This is a common occur-
rence in the media (McCombs, 2013). The abundance of articles affiliated with carnivore
conservation organizations—who were often vehemently opposed to any lethal control of
carnivores—was in direct contrast with the views of trophy hunting organizations expressed
in the articles, the latter of whom believed that creating financial markets from carnivores
was the only way to save these species. These polarized views are indicative of the under-
lying principles each organization adhered to. Newspaper companies themselves may also
have one-sided views about particular topics, which may skew their reporting of the issue
(D’Alessio & Allen, 2000; Groseclose & Milyo, 2005). NGOs often rely on donor funding
for their running costs and could promote certain activities that align with their donors’
points of view. It is uncommon for NGOs to communicate project failures because of pos-
sible loss of donor support (Redford & Taber, 2000). As such, facts can become distorted
into partial truths in the media and researchers must be cautious to use newspapers when
their aim is to determine accurate reflections of reality.
There were a number of limitations to this study. As the literacy rate of Namibia is only
85% (IREX, 2013), not all citizens had access to information sourced in newspapers. Also
newspapers were not widely accessible across the rural areas of Namibia where most of
the country’s carnivores were found. Together these limitations suggest that some citizens
were not susceptible to the media’s possible framing effects. Lastly, the results of this study
may differ if content analysis was undertaken on other forms of media, such as radio or
television. Further research is needed to determine whether this is the case.
In conclusion, this research has shown that financial incentives to mitigate human–
carnivore conflict were more likely to be reported positively or ambivalently rather than
negatively. This may indicate that financial mechanisms such as compensation, trophy
hunting, and tourism have a potential role to play in reducing this conflict for people glob-
ally. Compensation in particular was frequently mentioned in newspaper articles and also
was often reported positively because of its potential for conflict to be resolved via finan-
cial reimbursement. However, there was a clear lack of evidence to justify these claims.
This could suggest that newspapers were used as lobbying mediums by interest groups to
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push their own agenda. Thus it is important for conservation practitioners and academics
to inform the media on fact-based findings related to wildlife conservation tools, which can
then help shape public opinion. Other financial incentives such as photographic tourism
and conservancies were framed more ambivalently, often because the benefits of these
schemes did not outweigh the costs to communities. Results imply it would be prudent for
conservationists to use caution when solely relying on these incentives to increase tolerance
to carnivores if no other means are available to offset livestock depredation.
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Appendix: List of Keywords Used in Newspaper Search Engines
1. “wildlife conflict”
2. “livestock kill”
3. “wildlife incentive”
4. “manage carnivore”
5. “predator”
6. “wildlife OR carnivore tax”
7. “wildlife OR carnivore fine”
8. “wildlife OR carnivore poach”
9. “conservation OR wildlife subsid∗”
10. “wildlife insurance OR compensa-
tion”
11. “eco label OR certification”
12. “tourism carnivore”
13. “hunting carnivore”
14. “livestock carnivore”
15. “leopard OR cheetah OR lion AND
livestock”
16. “economic carnivore”
17. “carnivore incentive”
18. “financial carnivore”
19. “easement”
20. “conservation OR habitat bank”
21. “debt for nature”
22. “wildlife acquisition”
23. “habitat OR biodiversity auction”
24. “payment for ecosystem services”
25. “biodiversity offset”
26. “agri environment scheme
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